Limping Toward Elysium: Impediments Created by the Myth of Westphalia on Humanitarian Intervention in the International Legal System Note by Carley, Stephen
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Law Review School of Law 
2009 
Limping Toward Elysium: Impediments Created by the Myth of 
Westphalia on Humanitarian Intervention in the International 
Legal System Note 
Stephen Carley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review 
Recommended Citation 
Carley, Stephen, "Limping Toward Elysium: Impediments Created by the Myth of Westphalia on 






VOLUME 41 JULY 2009 NUMBER 5 
 
Note 
LIMPING TOWARD ELYSIUM: IMPEDIMENTS CREATED BY THE MYTH 
OF WESTPHALIA ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
STEPHEN CARLEY 
The present international system is broadly thought to consist of nation-states 
possessing certain essential characteristics: a fixed population and territory, 
formal equality in external relations and, in nearly all cases, unquestioned 
domestic authority to conduct its internal affairs in any way it deems fit.  That last 
characteristic, often viewed by historians, legal actors and diplomats as a central 
and indispensable principle of the international system, is the one most commonly 
associated with status as a nation-state and, in the language of international law, 
is understood as the essence of sovereignty.  
With respect to the internal authority of a sovereign nation-state, few concepts 
of law in the history of Western or any civilization are viewed in such absolute 
terms.  While slow, progressive strides have been made in humanitarian and 
human rights law, the orthodox core of international law maintains that such 
trends are mere outgrowths of the positive and consensual law of sovereign states.  
Sovereignty is therefore viewed as a fixed star, around which all other forces in 
international law and political affairs must move. 
When inquiries are made into the source of international law’s slavish 
adherence to internal sovereignty, the inquisitor is invariably referred to the 
Treaties of Westphalia of 1648, the ostensible foundation for the orthodox view of 
international law.  However, as is explored in the work that follows, emerging 
historical scholarship and a closer view at the treaties themselves contradict the 
orthodox perspective on a number of serious and substantive points. 
Despite its dubious historical account, the orthodox view has permanently 
influenced the development of international theory and law, particularly as 
applied to the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter of the United Nations.  
The Charter’s travaux preparatoires reveal that the post-World War II Great 
Powers utilized the false historical and normative assumptions of the orthodox 
Westphalian view to eviscerate meaningful provisions for humanitarian 
intervention, a consequence of the myth of Westphalia that can be felt even today. 
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 LIMPING TOWARD ELYSIUM: IMPEDIMENTS CREATED BY THE MYTH 
OF WESTPHALIA ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
STEPHEN CARLEY∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Progress in the field of human rights has been slow, though it has not 
had the virtue of being steady.  On the other hand, the world is coming to 
the realization that all persons, regardless of origin, ought to be afforded a 
certain measure of rights to enable them to live safe, productive and 
meaningful lives.  Much, but certainly not all, of current international legal 
and political discourse focuses on how much liberty and security the 
people of the world deserve, and, what is a more comfortable subject for 
lawyers, how to provide them with it. 
There are many obstacles to this process: political, psychological, 
institutional, systemic.  One such obstacle is the idea that nation-states still 
possess something like “absolute internal sovereignty”; that is, states are 
not only equal among themselves but also retain unfettered and total 
discretion to determine what occurs within their own borders,1 and as such 
no outsiders may interfere in their internal affairs.2  Though stripped of 
much of its persuasive force in recent decades, the continuing—and 
perplexing—notion of this principle of absolute internal sovereignty is one 
of the most prominent obstacles to realizing international human rights.  
                                                                                                                          
∗ The College of William & Mary, B.A. 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 
Candidate 2009.  My thanks go to Professor Laura Dickinson, whose criticism and guidance were 
essential to the creation and improvement of this work.  Additional thanks go to my parents, who 
always encouraged me to pursue my dreams; the tireless staff of the Connecticut Law Review; and to 
my fiancée Meghan, whose support has been, and will remain, absolutely essential to all my success.  
All errors that remain are mine. 
1 Though the concept of sovereignty often refers both to internal sovereignty—the exclusivity of 
control by a nation-state over its domestic affairs—and external sovereignty—the same degree of 
control over the state’s priorities in foreign affairs—this Note concerns itself only with the former 
meaning. 
2 Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1685, 
1688 (1994–1995); John Alan Cohan, Essay, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 
907, 908–09 (2006); Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 28–29 
(1948); Alun A. Preece, The Rise and Fall of National Sovereignty, 8 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. ANN. 
229, 229–30 (2003).  There are, of course, many other obstacles to the uniform and universal 
realization and enforcement of human rights norms—many of which overlap.  Some such obstacles 
include various forms of racism, nationalism, sexism, religious fanaticism, power disparities, lack of 
democratic traditions and institutions, lack of education, lack of sustainable development, poverty, 
economic exploitation, homophobia and a distrust of peoples of different backgrounds and the 
institutional regimes theoretically designed to protect them.  I certainly do not flatter myself capable of 
presenting a complete list here, nor do I intend to explore any of the foregoing in great detail.  Such is 
outside the bounds of this Note. 
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For instance, the 2007 democratic movement in Burma was left 
unsupported by the international community due in part to the 
intransigence of this odd and destructive idea.3 
The actual sources for this particular normative view of sovereignty 
are less than perfectly clear.4  Yet, at least since the middle portion of the 
last century, the standard story is that absolute sovereignty has been the 
norm since the great European powers signed the Treaties of Westphalia, 
covenants which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648.5  According to the 
champions of this paradigm, those nations involved in the war and its 
resolution, the Peace of Westphalia (“the Peace”), heroically shuffled off 
the coil of feudal and papal oppression in favor of entirely autonomous 
territories—the blessed “States” with a capital “S”—ruled, at least in 
theory, by secular authorities answerable to no one.6  From there, the 
standard story goes, the absolute sovereign system spread to the other 
European peoples and, eventually, to the remainder of the world.7 
This view of sovereignty has become the de facto standard 
interpretation of international legal and political history, particularly in 
legal scholarship8 and international relations theory, a discipline whose star 
                                                                                                                          
3 See infra Part V. 
4 See infra Part III. 
5 Stephane Beaulac, The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy—Myth or Reality?, 2 J. HIST. INT’L L. 
148, 148 (2000) (“In public international law, there may not be a greater orthodoxy than that according 
to which the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War in Europe, constitutes a 
paradigm shift in the development of our state system.  The twin congress then held is deemed the 
forum where distinct separate polities became sovereign, that is, enjoying absolute and exclusive 
control and power over a relatively well-defined territory.”) (footnote omitted); Cohan, supra note 2, at 
914; Gross, supra note 2, at 28; Preece, supra note 2, at 229. 
6 See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 312 (3d ed. 1960) (“By the end of the 
Thirty Years’ War, sovereignty as supreme power over a certain territory was a political fact, signifying 
the victory of the territorial princes over the universal authority of emperor and pope, on the one hand, 
and over the particularistic aspirations of the feudal barons, on the other.”); Beaulac, supra note 5, at 
148–49; Gross, supra note 2, at 28–29; Preece, supra note 2, at 230. 
7 See Richard N. Haass, Dir., Policy Planning Staff, U.S. State Dep’t, Sovereignty: Existing 
Rights, Evolving Responsibilities, Remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center 
for International Studies, Georgetown University (Jan. 14, 2003), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/16648.htm (“[Following the Peace of Westphalia, s]overeignty helped to 
stabilize Europe and, over time, the principle spread.  For China and Japan, recognition of their 
sovereign equality by other states became a symbol of having arrived.  Later, the desire for sovereignty 
became the motivating force for the decolonization movement that transformed international relations 
after World War II.”); Preece, supra note 2, at 234 (“After 1648, the concept of national sovereignty 
spread beyond Europe, as relations developed with countries in other continents, and as European and 
other countries gained independence by war, rebellion or peaceful legal processes.”) (footnote omitted).  
Whether this expansion of absolute sovereignty to nations outside Europe occurred naturally as a result 
of the inherent “genius” of the idea or was simply thrust onto colonial peoples by virtue of European 
imperial dominance has, to my knowledge, never been fully explored and is, apparently, a matter of the 
particular proponent’s degree of historical delusion. 
8 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 148–49; Preece, supra note 2, at 230; see also Cohan, supra note 2, at 
914 (“Westphalian sovereignty is the type of sovereignty that is the most well-known in academic 
discourse.”); Gross, supra note 2, at 26–27 (“It can hardly be denied that the Peace of Westphalia 
marked an epoch in the evolution of international law.  It undoubtedly promoted the laicization of 
international law by divorcing it from any particular religious background, and the extension of its 
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rose concurrently with the standard story of sovereignty.9  It has become so 
pervasive, in fact, that even critics of absolute sovereignty have implicitly 
admitted that it represents historical fact, even while they proceed 
vigorously to dispute the wisdom of its corollaries.10  Reflecting this long-
standing consensus, some legal scholars have taken to calling the accepted 
idea of absolute sovereignty, beginning in 1648, the orthodox paradigm or 
“Westphalian orthodoxy.”11 
Insightful and courageous scholarship by authors such as Stephane 
Beaulac, however, has recently called the traditional paradigm into serious 
question.  Review of the political and religious power structure in Europe 
leading up to and following the Thirty Years War indicates, according to 
Beaulac’s research and an accompanying close inspection of the treaties’ 
history, that Westphalian orthodoxy is a gross over-simplification in some 
respects and a total misrepresentation of the historical evidence in others.12  
The Thirty Years War, and the international treaties that ended it, emerged 
out of the patch-work quilt of overlapping authorities and alliances 
including feudal lords, pseudo-monarchical princes, the Holy Roman 
Emperor and the papacy, all engaged in a host of secular and religious 
power struggles in multiple political dimensions, stemming largely from 
the divisive pressures of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation.13  
When the series of armed conflicts drew to a close, the allied parties signed 
two treaties setting terms of the Peace: one, the Treaty of Osnabrück 
concluded between the Holy Roman Emperor and German princes with the 
                                                                                                                          
scope so as to include, on a footing of equality, republican and monarchical states.  Indeed these two 
by-products of the Peace of 1648 would seem significant enough for students of international law and 
relations to regard it as an event of outstanding and lasting value.”).  For a discussion on the certainty 
of Gross’s view, see infra notes 114–118 and accompanying text. 
9 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT: POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 93, 113 (Hans Reiss ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 2d enlarged ed. 1991) (“The idea of 
international right presupposes the separate existence of many independent adjoining states.”).  In 
making that claim, Kant, viewed as an early advocate of something like modern liberal international 
relations theory, notably admits what has become a bedrock assumption for all of realism’s normative 
and descriptive claims.  It is unfortunate that even liberal international relations theorists, who dispute 
many of the basic tenets of realism, implicitly admit that nation-states, through some kind of natural 
order, ought to exercise de jure absolute sovereignty or something akin to it. 
10 See, e.g., John R. Worth, Note, Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National Sovereignty: 
Reconsidering the “Un-signing” of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of Senator Bricker, 79 IND. L.J. 
245, 247, 259 (2004) (explaining, in a commentary criticizing the United States for shirking its 
international responsibility by “un-signing” the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, that 
“in the decades following the Treaty of Westphalia, nation-states were individualistic and thrived on 
self-sufficiency”). 
11 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 148, 150. 
12 See infra Part II. 
13 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 152–53, 155; Gross, supra note 2, at 28–29; Preece, supra note 2, at 
229–30, 232; see also Cohan, supra note 2, at 914 (“The concept [of Westphalian sovereignty] gains its 
name from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which dealt with ending the Thirty Years War.  The treaty 
represented the concession of some power by the emperor, with his claim of holy predominance, to 
numerous kings and lords who wished to vigilantly [sic] protect their own feudal powers.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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Protestant Queen of Sweden, and two, the Treaty of Münster with the 
Catholic King of France.14  In addition to limiting the princes’ ability to 
control the religious beliefs and practices of their subjects, the treaties also 
restrained the secular governments from discrimination against religious 
minorities in the secular sphere.15  In terms of territorial settlements, much 
of the power of the Holy Roman Empire (“the Empire”) was retained; 
Sweden gained feudal trusteeship of some lands formerly held by the 
Empire, and though France’s acquisitions were more complete, at least one 
acquired territory held onto its semi-autonomous status.16   
Furthermore, as demonstrated in part by Beaulac’s research, the 
powers the monarchies actually wielded following the consummation of 
the treaties betrays traditional Westphalian orthodoxy.  The lands held by 
the German princes—supposedly gaining total authority as the 
beneficiaries of their newfound status as sovereigns—were granted the 
power to form alliances, though any international treaties or agreements 
could not be against the interests of the Empire or the treaties themselves, 
and the Empire itself retained authority to control legislation, warfare and 
taxation.17  Following the Peace, the Empire preserved its legislative and 
quasi-judicial body, the Diet, in which Sweden was to sit as representative 
of its newly acquired territories, and which was responsible for ensuring 
respect for the terms regarding religious liberty.18  The transcendental Holy 
Roman Empire’s atrophy of power vis-à-vis the secular principalities had 
begun long before the seventeenth century and concluded only in 1806 
with Napoleon’s conquest of all of Germany.19  What is more, even in the 
case of divided continental regions such as the Italian peninsula and the 
German Confederation, something approaching complete internal 
sovereignty under a unified government was not achieved until nearly the 
end of the nineteenth century.20 
The emerging historical evidence, as well as many facts surrounding 
the treaties never in doubt, suggest that the treaties’ primary purposes and 
effects concerned religious and minor territorial matters, and were not 
fundamentally structural.  Though if that is the case, why was any 
historical account to the contrary not rejected when it was proposed?  As I 
                                                                                                                          
14 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 162. 
15 Id. at 164–65; Preece, supra note 2, at 230. 
16 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 165–66. 
17 Id. at 167–68. 
18 Id. at 165, 170. 
19 Id. at 172–73; see also Preece, supra note 2, at 231 (explaining that the Empire was finally “put 
out of its misery” with the Napoleonic conquest in 1806). 
20 See Heinhard Steiger, Peace Treaties from Paris to Versailles, in PEACE TREATIES AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 59, 61 (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2004) (explaining that for 
the small territories in the German Confederation and Italy, because “the widespread aspirations for 
unity to become a nation-state were not met, these aspirations continued to influence the political 
developments in Europe during the first fifty-five years after the Congress of Vienna, until 1870/71 
when both achieved their objective of becoming unified states”). 
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shall discuss, the particular timing of this revisionist account of 
Westphalia’s place in history—including Leo Gross’s famous article, The 
Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948—made it particularly palatable to 
Western powers seeking to retain their dominance in the world political 
and legal order, as well as to Western political and legal theorists searching 
for a way to simplify and justify their views on the nature of that order ex 
post.21  Furthermore, Westphalian orthodoxy neatly—if somewhat 
inaccurately—fit with the values espoused by political philosophers such 
as Bodin, Hobbes, Grotius and Bentham and explained the basis for the 
powers claimed and exercised by the absolutist monarchies of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as the colonial empires that 
dominated much of the population of the world well into the twentieth.22 
The state-centered world order—with its fictional historical and 
conceptual antecedent, Westphalian orthodoxy—and the authority wielded 
by the so-called Great Powers faced major challenges with the catastrophes 
of the twentieth-century world wars.  In response, a new universal 
organization, the United Nations, emerged and was profoundly influenced 
by a new, human rights-based cosmopolitan ethic, though it certainly was 
not immune to the long-standing and powerful influences of the surviving 
European empires, the totalitarian Soviet bloc, and the largely democratic 
newcomer, the United States.23  A large portion of the character of that new 
organization came to reflect, somewhat schizophrenically, the competing 
norms of human rights on the one hand, and maintaining pre-World War II 
internal sovereignty on the other.24  As will be explored in greater detail, 
certain provisions of the UN Charter (“the Charter”) and the organization’s 
power structure refer to its commitment to securing and promoting human 
rights, while others pledge their commitment to retaining the sanctity of 
matters “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” of its member 
states.25  The travaux preparatoires of the Charter tell the story of how a 
shared but mistaken understanding of internal sovereignty was utilized to 
limit the competence of the Security Council’s enforcement powers and to 
convert a legally binding international bill of rights into a non-binding 
universal declaration.26 
Ever since the immediate post-war era, the extent of adherence to 
                                                                                                                          
21 See infra Part III.B. 
22 See infra Part III.A. 
23 See Preece, supra note 2, at 238 (“It took a yet more destructive war to lead to the 
establishment of the United Nations in 1945.  The massive violation of the rights of civilians that 
occurred in the Second, as opposed to the First, World War sparked a much greater concern with 
human rights: hence, the adoption of human rights covenants, beginning with the International 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and the spawning of a plethora of international organisations 
aimed at enforcing these rights.”). 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
26 See infra Part IV. 
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Westphalian orthodoxy has an inverse effect upon the enforcement of 
international human rights, particularly with respect to intervention issues, 
which meet head-on the sovereignty-human rights conflict.27  In cases 
where totalitarian regimes severely curtail the forces of democracy and 
individual liberty, this Note will also explore how Westphalian orthodoxy, 
among other factors, acts like a braking mechanism on the progressive 
expansion of human rights and thereby has a substantial effect upon the 
experience of individuals and oppressed societies around the world.28  One 
such example from recent headlines is Burma, known also as Myanmar, a 
state in Southeast Asia whose ruling military junta brutally repressed the 
largest pro-democracy movement in the nation in twenty years.29  As I 
shall explore in context, part of the international community’s reluctance to 
intervene on behalf of the Burmese people in 2007 and since stems from 
the effects of a robust—and misplaced—general belief in the myth of 
Westphalia as a cherished norm in international law and political affairs.30 
As a matter of structure, Part II of this Note will consider in greater 
detail the historical evidence surrounding the Peace of Westphalia and the 
treaties it engendered as brought into new light by recent scholarship 
challenging the orthodox paradigm.  With reason to believe that 
Westphalian orthodoxy is almost entirely an historical fiction, Part III will 
explore some likely sources for the fictional account and why it gained the 
attraction and following it has.  Part IV will review the way in which the 
Westphalian myth helped codify great power rule in the international 
political and legal order, with particular emphasis upon the UN Charter, 
the functioning of the Security Council, and the limitations placed on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Part V then serves to add color to 
the present discussion by demonstrating the effects of this attitude toward 
global order and the prioritization of the myth of sovereignty over 
humanitarian and democratic concerns.  Reflections upon the extent of 
hindrances created by continued adherence to Westphalian orthodoxy draw 
the Note to a close in Part VI. 
                                                                                                                          
27 See Cohan, supra note 2, at 915 (“Westphalian sovereignty may be thought of as an absolute 
norm of nonintervention.”). 
28 See infra Part V.A. 
29 Thomas Fuller, Burmese Junta Admits at Least 15 Died in Protests, Envoy Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 17, 2007, at A5, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (describing the extent of the junta’s 
response to the August-September protests); Seth Mydans, Monks’ Protest Is Challenging Burmese 
Junta, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (describing 
actions by Burmese monks as the largest pro-democracy protests in two decades). 
30 See infra Part V.B. 
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II.  HISTORICAL REALITY VERSUS THE MYTH OF WESTPHALIAN 
ORTHODOXY 
A.  Medieval European Political Reality Preliminary to the Thirty Years 
War 
The standard story told by the proponents—and implicitly accepted by 
a great many opponents—of absolute state sovereignty is that the authors 
of the Treaties of Westphalia, in a flash of brilliance, rid Europe forever of 
the chaos of the petty parochial interests of feudal lords and the universal 
religious aspirations of the pope and Holy Roman Emperor, bent on 
domination of the entire civitas Christiana.31  Insofar as this standard story 
assumes that authority in Europe in the Middle Ages was divided amongst 
many different levels, both horizontal and vertical, of political and 
religious influence, it is correct, but its accuracy and veracity largely end 
there.32  As has been demonstrated by several authors and researchers, 
most recently and persuasively by Beaulac, it is clear that the evolution of 
European power structures from overlapping hierarchies to a system of 
perfectly equal and well-defined sovereign nation-states neither began nor 
ended with the Peace of Westphalia, nor did 1648 even signify the end of 
influence from transcendental institutions such as the Catholic Church or 
the Holy Roman Empire.33 
Well before the eruption of hostilities that comprised the Thirty Years 
War in 1618, European territories in the Middle Ages—particularly 
Germany—were ruled by a hodge-podge of secular and religious 
authorities lacking formal ties of unity or any of the marks of modern 
                                                                                                                          
31 See Haass, supra note 7 (“In Europe before sovereignty, political authority was shared by 
empires, kingdoms, duchies, and city-states.  Complicating matters further, there was no clear boundary 
separating religious and secular authority.  Popes and kings claimed—and fought over—the same 
peoples and territories.  This patchwork of overlapping authorities proved flammable when the wars of 
religion ignited following the Reformation. . . . In response, European rulers came to embrace 
sovereignty as a means to maintain a basic level of order, both within individual countries and in 
relations between and among them.  A pivotal event in this process was the Peace of Westphalia of 
1648 . . . . Sovereignty helped to stabilize Europe and . . . has been a source of stability for more than 
two centuries.”); see also Preece, supra note 2, at 230, 232 (“The Westphalian doctrine involved the 
recognition that, in order to avoid perpetual conflict as a result of religious differences, states must be 
allowed to differ on fundamental aspects of their internal organisation. . . . [Before 1648,] interference 
in ‘internal’ affairs of territories was easily justified on the basis of some alleged feudal right, or, after 
1517, in the name of maintaining the true universal Christian religion against allegedly heretical 
reformers.”). 
32 See Beaulac, supra note 5, at 150–51 (“[The Peace of Westphalia in] 1648 does not close the 
final chapter of the multilayered system of authority in Europe.  Rather, it constitutes but one instance 
where distinct separate political entities strived for more power through independence, which was only 
achieved long after the Peace.”). 
33 See Randall Lesaffer, Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia, in PEACE TREATIES AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY, supra note 20, at 9, 43; Beaulac, supra note 5, at 175–
76.  Cf. Preece, supra note 2, at 232 (maintaining that the Westphalian Settlement significantly reduced 
the authority of the Holy Roman Emperor). 
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nationalism.34  The average European could expect to be the subject of any 
number of vassals, feudal lords, secular monarchs or religious nobles under 
the authority of the pope and, assuming loyal behavior, the object of a 
varied array of rights in land and duties toward his or her family and local 
master.35  England was the most centralized and organized monarchy 
without ties to Rome, but even France and Spain, insofar as they could be 
called nations, actively resisted feudal ties to the pope and the German 
Empire.36  In the transcendental sphere, both the emperors and popes 
attempted to harness the unifying forces of the Crusades to rule the whole 
of Christendom, though the Catholic Church’s efforts were severely 
hindered by the Great Schism beginning in 1378 that divided the Catholic 
world and nearly doomed the papacy.37 
In the century and a half before Westphalia, the forces of the 
Reformation did the most to encourage the peoples and princes of Europe 
to turn away from the Church and to establish secular governments.38  As 
the Empire lost its ties with the same peoples who had largely abandoned 
the Catholic Church, those nations—mostly England, France, Spain and 
many city-states in northern Italy—were the first to establish autonomous 
regions under mostly secular authorities.39  Though the methods these 
nations employed in moving toward centralized government were as 
diverse as the cultures of their citizens, it is perfectly clear that this process 
began well before the outbreak of the Thirty Years War and its peaceful 
resolution in the middle of the seventeenth century.40 
Even among the growing principalities within the Empire itself, local 
and regional rulers were granted increasing autonomy to set both secular 
                                                                                                                          
34 See Beaulac, supra note 5, at 152–53, 155 (explaining the various authorities seeking 
dominance in European affairs, particularly between the Catholic Church and Holy Roman Empire and 
between those two transcendental institutions and the “countless subordinate civil societies of Europe” 
comprised of feudal lords and monarchs); see also G. CLARK, EARLY MODERN EUROPE FROM ABOUT 
1450 TO ABOUT 1720, at 28 (London, Oxford University Press 1960) (“Europe was not divided up into 
exclusive sovereignties, but was covered by overlapping and constantly shifting lordships.”); Preece, 
supra note 2, at 232 (“In pre-1648 Europe, with its lack of a clear definition of national sovereignty, but 
rather a patchwork of rambling and competing feudal empires, there was no clear distinction between 
internal and external affairs.”). 
35 See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (4th ed. 2003) 
(describing the conflicting “political, legal, religious, and moral allegiances” faced by Europeans 
during this time period); Beaulac, supra note 5, at 152 (describing how heteronomous communities and 
principalities overlapped, providing individuals with “different rights and obligations” under the 
decentralized feudal structure). 
36 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 155, 157–59; see also Preece, supra note 2, at 233–34 (describing the 
various efforts of England, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, France and Switzerland to resist the coercive 
tactics and religious hegemony of the Catholic Church). 
37 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 155. 
38 Id. at 155, 159–60. 
39 Id. at 157–59. 
40 Id. at 159, 161–62; see also Preece, supra note 2, at 233 (“In the century or more prior to 1648, 
a limited number of European countries succeeded in establishing the essentials of national sovereignty 
by breaking away from allegiance to the Pope.”). 
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and religious policy for their subjects in the two centuries leading up to the 
Thirty Years War.41  Indeed, the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, negotiated on 
equal terms between the German monarchs and the emperor, was the most 
prominent move in the direction of local control, formalizing and codifying 
the practice of cuius region eius religio, i.e., the religion of the king is the 
religion of the kingdom.42  This practice—combined with the increasingly 
restrictive laws on religious worship imposed by Emperor Rudolf II—
provoked considerable resentment between Catholics and the growing 
Protestant minorities.43 
More kindling was added to fuel the eventual conflagration as 
Protestant and Catholic factions, both within the Empire and in nearly 
every other European nation—England, Denmark, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, France, Spain—formed armed coalitions or began arming as a 
nation, loosely constructed, in response to minor violent outbursts.44  
Beginning at the close of the sixteenth century, and in a manner eerily 
reminiscent of the complex network of treaties that accelerated and 
amplified the First World War approximately three hundred years later, 
those coalitions formed alliances with each other in anticipation of the 
other side’s desire to establish religious and political hegemony.45 
B.  Precipitating Events and Parties to the Thirty Years War 
The limited shifts toward greater local control and, for Lutherans living 
in ecclesiastical territories, religious tolerance that had been intended by 
the parties to the Peace of Augsburg were unable to check adequately the 
increasing attitudes of disaffection and malevolence felt by the Catholic 
and Protestant populations.  Within the territory of the Empire itself, and 
especially in Bohemia, the Treaty of Augsburg did little to ensure respect 
for the minority’s religious views.46  There, in fact, a devout Catholic, 
Ferdinand II, was named as the successor to Emperor Matthias, and 
Ferdinand sent two Catholic councilors to Prague in May of 1618 to 
manage Bohemian affairs while the emperor took up his new office.47 
                                                                                                                          
41 See Beaulac, supra note 5, at 159 (“With respect to secular matters, increasingly substantial 
political concessions were gradually granted in favour of the principalities.  As regards religious 
matters, several powerful German Princes took the Protestant side in the emerging conflicts and they 
revolted against the Holy Roman Empire.”) (footnote omitted).  Beaulac also describes how religious 
authority was given over to the monarchies in a negotiated settlement with the Empire.  Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 160. 
45 Id. 
46 See Arthur MacDonald, Suggestions of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia for the Peace 
Conference in France, 88 CENT. L.J. 302, 305 (1919) (“The religious peace of Augsburg (1555) 
furnished no settlement to questions stirred up by the Reformation.”). 
47 See id. at 305, 306 (noting the presence of “two detested representatives of the [German] 
Crown” in Prague in May of 1618 and recalling that Ferdinand II, as emperor early in the war, “said he 
would rather beg or be cut to pieces than submit to [Protestant] heresy”). 
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Protestants, fearing a loss of their power under the new emperor, 
stormed the imperial palace, seized the two councilors and threw them out 
a window nearly seventy feet off the ground.48  Known as the 
Defenestration of Prague, the near-deaths of the new emperor’s councilors 
at the hands of the Protestant minority sparked a general revolt in 
Bohemia, a conflict which spread between all German religious forces, 
waged in part by the armed coalitions of the Protestant Evangelical Union 
and the Catholic League.49 
The new and comparatively weak Emperor Ferdinand II, facing an 
increasingly aggressive Protestant minority, called on his ally Phillip IV, 
the Spanish king, for assistance.  France, though it was primarily Catholic, 
actively opposed the Habsburg-Spanish alliance and joined forces with 
Sweden to intervene on behalf of the Protestants; within a decade of the 
original religious rebellion in Bohemia, the spreading conflict became 
dominated by the political forces of the allied nations against the Empire.50  
The battles themselves, primarily fought on German territory, devastated 
Europe and nearly all of the regions of the disordered Empire, eliminating 
large proportions of the population through famine and disease as well as 
destroying vast quantities of property.51 
Several powers, including Denmark, Venice, England and the papacy, 
failed several times to intervene and mediate a resolution to the conflict.  
The conflict extended and its destruction intensified partially because of 
the inability of the belligerents to agree on diplomatic procedures 
necessary to a multilateral peace settlement.52  Some of the disputed 
procedures concerned the attempts to include the German princes as equal 
parties to the negotiation, suggesting that there was absolutely no 
agreement about whether or in what way the principalities should be 
subordinated to the emperor.53  After approximately nine years of 
negotiations, concessions finally made by the Empire and the Vatican as 
the chief mediating authority, permitted joint negotiated settlements with 
                                                                                                                          
48 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 160 n.72. 
49 Id. at 160; see also JANIS, supra note 35, at 161–62 (describing the defenestration as the onset 
of the bloody religious wars that were to follow). 
50 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 161. 
51 MacDonald, supra note 46, at 305, 306. 
52 Kenneth Colegrove, Diplomatic Procedure Preliminary to the Congress of Westphalia, 13 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 450, 450 (1919). 
53 See id. at 450–51 (“The theoretical or ceremonial equality of states as now recognized in 
international law was by no means established [prior to the Peace], and the contest for pre-eminence 
among the crowns of Europe embittered national feelings and embarrassed the work of diplomats.  The 
Holy Roman Empire, whose jurists had so positively claimed for it a universal jurisdiction, was 
crumbling into smaller units; princes and estates within the Empire, technically subordinate but 
practically independent of the Emperor, added to the diplomatic confusion by their demands for direct 
participation in international affairs . . . .”); see also Beaulac, supra note 5, at 163 (noting that the 
insistence of Sweden and France to have the German monarchs as parties to both treaties was a 
strategy, ultimately successful, to weaken the negotiating position of the emperor). 
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France in the city of Münster and concurrently with the Queen of Sweden 
in the nearby city of Osnabrück.  This proved a major political and 
diplomatic victory for the Swedes; they had previously been unable to 
achieve the respect and recognition accorded to those elite nations on the 
extreme end of the European power spectrum, most specifically France and 
the Empire itself.54 
C.  Treaty Terms and Institutional Changes Incident to the Peace 
The hostilities came to an end without a decisive victory by either side, 
and in the treaties that emerged, the major parties negotiated territorial, 
structural and religious terms designed to prevent—or at least to minimize 
—future armed inter-conflict.  It is clear from the complexity of several of 
the treaties’ provisions, particularly those with respect to territorial 
exchanges and institutional powers, that a number of methods for dividing 
power were on the table; particular provisions allocating authority could 
be, and were, traded by the parties in return for concessions elsewhere. 
Though on balance Sweden and France won more territorial 
acquisitions from the Empire than vice versa, Sweden’s claims to the new 
lands under the Treaty of Osnabrück were explicitly limited.55  That is to 
say, Sweden’s acquisitions were not complete conveyances but rather new 
areas held in trust as “imperial fiefs” and for which the Swedish crown was 
to sit as representative in the Diet.56  For France, most of its territorial 
gains gave it full title, with the notable exception of Alsatia, which 
remained semi-autonomous due to its privileged position in the Empire.57 
Though the German monarchs were generally cooperative parties with 
the Empire while negotiating bilaterally with France and Sweden in the 
two respective treaties, their inclusion in the talks at the insistence of the 
latter meant both a weakening of the Empire and some limited 
modifications of their legal status.  Most significantly, Article 65 of the 
Treaty of Münster and Article 8, paragraph 1 of the Treaty of Osnabrück 
granted the principalities the power to conclude alliances with foreign 
nations.58  However, these external powers were not to be exercised against 
the interests of the Empire, lest they come into conflict with the explicit 
terms of the treaties themselves.59  Furthermore, though the treaties 
conferred a limited power upon the princes now recognized as “inherent in 
sovereignty,” the Empire retained the domestic powers of legislation, 
                                                                                                                          
54 Colegrove, supra note 52, at 480–81. 
55 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 165. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 165–66. 
58 Id. at 167. 
59 Id.  Beaulac also argues that, far from transferring a new and exclusive power of external 
relations to the secular princes, the treaties more or less codified a custom that had been followed by 
the monarchs since the beginning of the seventeenth century.  Id. at 168. 
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warfare and taxation through its Diet.60  Although these provisions in the 
treaties can fairly be seen as a further deterioration of the Empire’s 
political and legal authority, they in no way dissolved the Empire into 
distinct national entities.  On the contrary—as Beaulac’s research 
establishes—the treaties reaffirmed some of the Empire’s historic powers 
while recognizing the changing political landscape respecting local 
German rulers. 
Part of that recognition, in addition to extending a limited power of 
external relations to the principalities, also involved an explicit acceptance 
of external intervention into the affairs of any party if it failed to abide by 
the terms of the treaties.  Specifically, Article 123 of the Treaty of Münster 
stated “all Partys in this Transaction shall be oblig’d to defend and protect 
all and every Article of this Peace against any one, without distinction of 
Religion . . . .”61  This term effectively granted the right and, in fact, the 
legal duty of any party to the Peace—but, implicitly, France and Sweden in 
particular—to come to the aid of any group, including religious minorities 
within the Empire, deprived of a right guaranteed to them under the 
treaties.62  Far from establishing inviolable national frontiers and entirely 
sovereign governments answerable to no external authority, the treaties 
established “what may fairly be described as an international constitution, 
which gave to all its adherents the right of intervention to enforce its 
engagements.”63 
Both treaties not only failed to consecrate the idea of absolutely 
independent secular authorities, they also placed legal restrictions on the 
German princes with respect to exclusive enforcement of any particular 
Christian denomination within their territories.  Specifically, Article 5 of 
the Treaty of Osnabrück held that Catholics and Protestants embracing “a 
[r]eligion different from that of the Lord of the[ir] [t]erritory, shall in 
consequence of the said Peace be patiently suffered and tolerated” with 
respect to private religious practice, liberty of conscience and education.64  
Furthermore, the treaty protected those minorities from discriminatory 
exclusion from access to merchant guilds, poor houses, hospitals and other 
                                                                                                                          
60 Id. at 167–68. 
61 Treaty of Westphalia: Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France 
and Their Respective Allies art. 123, October 24, 1648, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp (spelling modernized).  In his article from 1948, 
Gross noted that the inclusion of this provision in the treaty was not without precedent in European 
peace settlements.  Gross, supra note 2, at 24. 
62 See Gross, supra note 2, at 24 (“These [Westphalian] treaties contain clauses by which Sweden 
and France not only make peace with the Emperor on certain terms, but pledge themselves to their 
allies, the subordinate German Princes, that they will ensure that the privileges and immunities 
conferred on the Princes and free cities of Germany in the treaty shall be upheld and maintained.” 
(quoting SIR JAMES HEADLAM-MORELEY, STUDIES IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 108 (1930))). 
63 Gross, supra note 2, at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DAVID JAYNE HILL, 2 A 
HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE 602 (1925)). 
64 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). 
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institutions available to the majority.65  Therefore, as opposed to the 
attempts at historical reification that were to follow, the Treaties of 
Westphalia contained several ground-breaking legal provisions for 
religious pluralism, enforced against domestic authorities in international 
law by both a transcendental institution and external governments.  A 
codification of absolute and exclusive power in the nation-state these 
treaties were not. 
D.  The European System Before and After Westphalia 
The traditional story told by proponents of Westphalian orthodoxy is 
that the Peace ended, for all intents and purposes, the authority of all 
entities above and below the level of the nation-state and left behind a 
system of secular governments which ruled autonomous territories without 
any outside interference whatsoever.  Unfortunately for the proponents, 
however, Beaulac’s scholarship strongly suggests that this version of 
history simply does not accord with the legal or political realities of the 
time. 
Were the prevailing view on Westphalia’s effects correct, one would 
reasonably expect the Empire to have quickly withered away along with all 
other feudal and religious institutions in and among the new independent 
states of Europe.  Instead, the Empire’s Diet was charged with the 
enforcement of the provisions for religious tolerance66 and affirmed in its 
traditional legislative powers.67  Beyond the sterile language of the treaties 
themselves, the Empire retained considerable practical influence and 
strength, though admittedly it did not thrive as it had in centuries past.  
Many of the German monarchs remained steadfast in their support of the 
emperor, the Diet and the imperial army, and the imperial courts retained 
their jurisdiction and functions well into the eighteenth century.68  The 
office of the emperor itself faced significant constraints on its power, but 
largely not until after 1711; that date saw the final enactment of the 
principle of Landeshoheit into imperial law, giving explicit effect to the 
                                                                                                                          
65 Id. at 164–65. 
66 See id. at 168–69 (“[T]he Empire remained a key factor according to Westphalia.  Indeed, it is 
through Imperial institutions—such as the Diet and the Courts—that religious safeguards were imposed 
in decision-making process.”).  Obviously, as previously noted, this responsibility was also given over 
to all parties, particularly France and Sweden, as an explicit legal right of intervention into the internal 
affairs of any party for violations of the Peace.  See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
67 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 167–68, 170.  Beaulac suggests that the Diet’s effectiveness as an 
exclusive transnational or national legislative body was significantly hindered from 1648 onward, as it 
generally required consensus from the Protestants and Catholics on matters of religion, a consensus 
seldom obtained.  Id. at 171.  It was not until the middle of the eighteenth century, however, that the 
Diet lost all or nearly all of its influence.  Id. at 171–72. 
68 Id. at 170, 172. 
 1756 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41: 1741 
expanding authority of the monarchs vis-à-vis the emperor.69  Thus, the 
compromises of Westphalia did not mean the dissolution of the Empire 
into a single or set of independent German nation-states, but rather another 
reduction in the Empire’s influence because of an inability to vindicate the 
subordination of the Protestants and their allies on the battlefield. 
Napoleon’s military campaign at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century is also extremely telling.  Though the transfer of lands to secular 
authorities from ecclesiastical rulers had been underway for hundreds of 
years in the Empire, that process was by no means complete by 1803, 
when the Diet passed its last major enactment, the 
Reichsdeputationshaupschuluss.70  That law was the final act of territorial 
redistribution, due primarily to French occupation of German lands west of 
the Rhine.  However, as there was no unity among the German 
principalities, Napoleon’s invasion and military conquest was directed 
against the last emperor, Francis II, who was instructed to abdicate the 
throne for all territories outside Austria.71  Therefore, the ultimate 
termination of the transcendental Holy Roman Empire did not come as a 
result of Westphalia or even at the behest of the secular German polities, 
but rather from an external threat made by imperial France, Europe’s new 
hegemonic power. 
In addition, institutions of authority other than the nation-state 
continued to exert considerable influence in the centuries following the 
Peace.  The Vatican, though not a politically unifying force as it had been 
during the Crusades, had developed and implemented doctrine since the 
beginning of the Reformation both to gather new adherents and to retain 
those Europeans considering conversion to the multiplicity of Protestant 
sects.  But despite the internal division of the Reformation and Counter-
Reformation, Rome nevertheless continued to act beyond its limited 
territory as a unifying spiritual and cultural bulwark against non-European 
powers, particularly the Ottoman Empire.  Moreover, the papacy’s 
willingness to mediate the end of the Thirty Years War betrays the 
proposition that the Peace removed it as a player in European affairs.  
Thus, any conclusion that the European nations, including pre-
revolutionary France, did or even could act utterly without regard to the 
dictates and preferences of the Vatican would be highly questionable.  
After the Congress of Vienna (“the Congress”), many European regions 
such as Italy and the German Confederation also lacked clear boundaries 
under a unified government, both necessary preconditions for statehood.72  
                                                                                                                          
69 Id. at 172.  The origins of the limitation of the office of the emperor imposed by the lower 
feudal monarchs date back to the Golden Bull, a constitutional provision establishing the rules for 
electing the emperor, passed nearly three hundred years before the Peace of Westphalia.  Id. 
70 Id. at 172–73. 
71 Id. at 173 n.148. 
72 See Steiger, supra note 20, at 61. 
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Thus, it was not only the continued significance of the Holy Roman 
Empire long after the Peace, but also the persistence of these non-national 
institutions and circumstances which defy the simplistic account portrayed 
by Westphalian orthodoxy. 
III.  HOW THE WESTPHALIAN MYTH BECAME ORTHODOXY 
A.  Likely Sources for the Orthodox Paradigm 
Given that neither the language of the treaties of Westphalia 
themselves nor the practical reality of European power in the years 
following 1648 suffice to justify the claims of Westphalian orthodoxy, the 
natural question can be put plainly: where did scholars and diplomats of 
recent memory go astray?  Put another way, if the traditional story of 
Westphalia—that the chaos of feudal Europe was quickly transformed into 
a system of co-equal, independent and absolutist nation-states—has no 
basis in legal or historical fact, why is the traditional story so widely 
accepted and disseminated? 
From a Western philosophical perspective, medieval notions of secular 
authority tempered by the dictates of heaven gave way to greater emphasis 
on positive law in the period just before, and for centuries after, 
Westphalia.  The process began with Jean Bodin, who wrote in his 1576 
treatise Republique that the person of the sovereign at the head of a 
government was the ultimate maker of law and subject to no restriction 
except the divine law of God.73  The initial grant of sovereignty to an 
earthly prince flowed along hereditary lines established by the Catholic 
Church, and all persons under the command of the sovereign were bound 
to obey that positive law unless that law contradicted a higher command 
from God.74  Bodin went beyond this limiting condition in his later 
writings by arguing that, in order for the earthly prince to be an effective 
ruler, the power he wielded had to be both “absolute and 
unchallengeable.”75 
Hugo Grotius, who had been Sweden’s ambassador during the 
negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia, also redirected post-Westphalian 
views of sovereignty among academics, philosophers and monarchs with 
his 1625 work De Jure Belli ac Pacis.76  Drawing on that natural law 
tradition of sixteenth-century Spanish theologians, and writing partially in 
response to the brutal excesses of the Thirty Years War, Grotius 
                                                                                                                          
73 Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver”—
Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT’L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 372 (2005). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 372–73 (citing JULIAN H. FRANKLIN, JEAN BODIN AND THE RISE OF ABSOLUTIST THEORY 
23 (1973)). 
76 That is, The Law of War and Peace. 
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emphasized that the law of nations both regulated the conduct of war itself 
and the voluntary, reciprocal interactions between sovereign states.77  As 
one of the representatives at Westphalia, Grotius did not claim that rulers 
had unfettered discretion to violate natural law.  Taking just the opposite 
view, Grotius stated: 
Least of all should that be admitted which some people 
imagine, that in war all laws are in abeyance.  On the 
contrary, war ought not to be undertaken except for the 
enforcement of rights; when once undertaken, it should be 
carried on only within the bounds of law and good faith.78 
Instead, Grotius’ contribution to the philosophical swing toward 
positivism involved the diminished roles the Empire and the Vatican 
played in his theory of international law and peace.  That is to say, Grotius 
argued that both natural and divine law demanded that rulers were bound 
not just to make but also to respect in good faith mutual promises of peace 
and cooperation as members of the society of nations.79  As those 
obligations were applicable directly to the sovereign nations who made 
them, the previous tasks of the emperor and pope as instruments of 
moderation were concomitantly restricted.80  Under his theory, then, 
Grotius made it incumbent on states to police themselves by following a 
“positive law of nations grounded on moral notions of covenant.”81 
While Grotius had moved international commitments from the realm 
of transcendental institutions to a more positive law of nations, the most 
influential personality on the topic of sovereignty addressed the scope and 
applicability of domestic positive law.  Thomas Hobbes, who wrote The 
Leviathan shortly after the Peace of Westphalia and while in exile in 
France, focused a great deal of his attention to describing the most 
appropriate characteristics of sovereign governments.82  For him, the 
philosophical ideal demanded that any authority claiming the status as a 
sovereign had to command the exclusive allegiance of its subjects and 
could not be restricted by any force external to it.83  Ignoring the details of 
                                                                                                                          
77 JANIS, supra note 35, at 164–66. 
78 Id. at 169 (emphasis added) (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 18 
(Kelsey trans., 1925)). 
79 JANIS, supra note 35, at 166–68. 
80 Id. at 169–70. 
81 Id. at 170. 
82 See id. at 162 (“Hobbes’ lasting contribution was the envisioning, in his own words, of ‘that 
great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which we owe under the 
Immortall God, our peace and defence.’  Rather than believing in any number of loyalties, Hobbes 
believed that all men required ‘a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the 
Common Benefit.’” (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Everyman’s Library ed. 1987))).  
83 See JANIS, supra note 35, at 163 (explaining that Hobbes had asserted that “the key actor on the 
world’s stage was the sovereign state to which all loyalty was due internally and which was 
unrestrained externally”). 
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the Westphalian Peace, and clearly breaking from medieval European 
feudal structures, Hobbes demanded that the sovereign state exercise 
plenary powers in a unitary form of government centered around a single 
person, the absolute monarch.84  Because individuals came together in the 
state of nature to form a government for the sole purpose of collective 
security, a novel concept in Western political philosophy,85 any limitation 
upon the power of the sovereign, external or internal, was for Hobbes an 
unacceptable violation of the rights of the individuals who formed it.86 
Hobbes’ impact upon Western thinking regarding the proper location 
and extent of ultimate law-making power within a nation cannot be 
overemphasized.  In a very real sense, Hobbes’ writings were instrumental 
in the way Western societies organized themselves for hundreds of years 
following their publication, including up to today.  Further, the particular 
values and definitions of sovereignty Hobbes utilized in his works were so 
influential and lasting because they came at a time when Europe was 
moving from a feudal to a state-centered political system.87  Those values 
also persisted because his political theories regarding the state of nature 
and the social contract—central themes in Enlightenment-era philosophy—
inspired so many later thinkers, including Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, 
Jefferson, and even Kant and Mill. 
Following Hobbes, the dominant philosophical stance on domestic 
legal authority had decisively moved from multi-tiered, decentralized 
organization among the entire civitas Christiana to unitary, absolutist 
sovereign states.  Yet this shift from the religious or natural law traditions 
to positivist theory in Europe did not end with Hobbes.  Jeremy 
Bentham—the founder of utilitarianism who famously derided natural law 
as “nonsense upon stilts”—also left his mark on the movement toward 
legal positivism.88  Bentham’s contribution was to alter the understanding 
                                                                                                                          
84 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 139, 151–52 (John 
Somerville & Ronald E. Santoni eds., 1963) (explaining that the state, as a “multitude so united in one 
person, is called a commonwealth,” or “that great Leviathan,” and that “he that carrieth this person, is 
called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and everyone besides, his subject”). 
85 That is, all medieval European notions of legitimate authority had been based on a delegation of 
divine power, through the Church, to a secular authority.  See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying 
text.  For Hobbes, however, the state of nature represented the human condition prior to any political 
organization of any kind, and as Hobbes envisioned such a condition to be a perpetual state of war, 
humans were justified in extracting themselves from that condition by vesting their rights in a 
sovereign for their mutual protection.  The fact that Hobbes based the organizing motivation for 
government on the needs and rights of individuals, apart from any divine delegation, was a truly 
revolutionary shift in political theory and arguably marked the beginning of the Enlightenment.  Kelly, 
supra note 73, at 375. 
86 Hobbes, supra note 84, at 151. 
87 JANIS, supra note 35, at 162. 
88 Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies L-6, available at http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/~dss4/ 
bentham1.pdf.  It is also worthy of note that in this same work—indeed, as an indispensable portion of 
his argument—Bentham defines natural rights as those which pre-exist law but determines that rights 
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of the law of nations, which had during the Middle Ages recognized some 
protection for individuals incident to the laws of war and as members of a 
global Christian community.89  Though his actions were perhaps 
inadvertent, Bentham proposed in 1789 replacing “the law of nations” with 
a new term, international law, which he defined in such a way as to 
eliminate any inclusion of individuals as subjects of the discipline.90  In so 
doing, Bentham distorted the traditional understanding of the positive laws 
by which nations abided.  Individuals, if they were to have any rights 
whatsoever, could only obtain them at the behest of their own state; as 
defined by Bentham, no person could ever claim protection in international 
law against the actions of the sovereign government of which he or she 
was a national.91 
The philosophical shift in both domestic and international legal theory 
from natural law to might-makes-right positivism was dramatic.92  Though 
there were pockets of resistance to the change,93 a tide of positivist legal 
theory washed into Western thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, relegating the protection of individuals and sub-national groups 
to a derided discipline of “private” international law.94  Even the more 
favored and respectable branch, “public” international law, which 
concerned itself solely with the interactions of nation-states as Bentham 
had proposed, was scorned by the English legal positivist John Austin, who 
called it merely “positive morality” and not really a form of law at all.95 
The political power and organization of Western civilization tracked, 
and was influenced by, these positivist and absolutist notions of sovereign 
                                                                                                                          
cannot but be based upon law, and insofar as laws require a sovereign, i.e., must be positive laws, no 
individual can be said to have any right without having it granted by the sovereign.  Id. at L-5–6. 
89 See Brand, supra note 2, at 1687–88 (“[In the Middle Ages, t]he ‘oneness’ of humanity was to 
be found through the pervasive unity of God (jus divinum) in the Respublica Christiana. . . . [M]edieval 
notions of sovereign power included limitations—based on abstract moral rights.  Thus, there were 
bounds beyond which the sovereign could not pass in its relations with the individual, and individual 
rights which were not alienable to the sovereign.”) (footnotes omitted). 
90 See JANIS, supra note 35, at 242–43 (describing how Bentham, in intending to replace the law 
of nations with international law, “really went much further” primarily by assuming that “international 
law was exclusively about the rights and obligations of states inter se and never about the rights and 
obligations of individuals”); JEREMY A. RABKIN, THE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY 101 (2004) (explaining 
that Bentham’s new term “‘[i]nternational law’ . . . was a law governing the mutual transactions 
between sovereigns—a law that was entirely between nations, rather than reaching into their internal 
affairs”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
91 See JANIS, supra note 35, at 244 (“Bentham excluded from the domain of his new subject all of 
those rules in the traditional law of nations that concerned private rights and obligations.”). 
92 See id. at 246 (“Regardless of its failings, Bentham’s definition of international law as a law for 
states alone has had a potent effect.  The states-only view of international law was generally adopted by 
nineteenth-century legal positivists who went further than Bentham in elaborating the ramifications of 
the definition.”). 
93 See id. at 248 (“Despite the positivists’ philosophical rejection of individuals as subjects of 
public international law, some parts of legal practice never entirely abandoned the more inclusive 
doctrine of the traditional law of nations.”). 
94 Id. at 246 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
95 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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states.  With the influence of transcendental institutions in sharp decline, 
European monarchs consolidated power into regimes of unquestioned 
authority, and why not?  Their actions had been sanctioned by the 
seemingly progressive theories of the Enlightenment philosophers.  Even 
the popular democratic revolutions in the United States and France focused 
on shifting the locus of sovereign power from the person of the monarch to 
the people, summarized by the expression “popular sovereignty.”  
However, despite the democratic attempt to empower the citizens directly 
with civil and political rights, neither revolution sought to abandon the 
positivist view.  If anything, the struggle for democratic self-government in 
those nations reinforced the idea of internal self-governance without 
admitting the possibility of outside interference in the operation of the new 
sovereign government.96 
As legal positivism became orthodoxy in the nineteenth and into the 
early twentieth century,97 absolutist, Hobbesian-style sovereignty became 
more commonplace in legal and political fact.98  Unlike medieval Europe, 
where groups oppressed by a local lord or monarch could conceivably 
bring their grievances to the attention of the pope or emperor, no such 
avenue of redress was available at all, particularly following the 
dissolution of the Empire in 1806.  A significant catalyst in solidifying the 
notion of the absolute sovereignty of European nation-states was the 
attempt by imperial France under Napoleon Bonaparte to gain control of 
all of Europe.99  Following the bloody and turbulent Napoleonic Wars, 
during which the le petit caporal attempted to establish France as the 
dominant power on the continent, old European dynasties consolidated 
power under the guise of attempts to banish such interference and warfare. 
The Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815 was the foremost vehicle for 
that purpose, concluded primarily between England, Russia, France, 
                                                                                                                          
96 The United States, as a new nation and a comparatively weak power on the world stage, made 
significant strides toward joining the new and independent nation-states of Europe through its 
recognition as a sovereign nation by Great Britain in 1789 and the implementation of the Monroe 
Doctrine in 1823.  See Preece, supra note 2, at 234–35 (“The independence of the United States added 
it to the Eurocentric world of nation-states, especially once the other American states gained their 
independence.  This process was greatly facilitated by the enunciation by President Monroe of the 
Monroe Doctrine, in 1823, as the fundamental principle of United States foreign policy.”).  This was 
also effectively the method by which the nation-states system spread to the newly independent Latin 
American nations.  Id. at 235. 
97 See JANIS, supra note 35, at 246 (“For most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
positivist definition of public international law as a law for states alone dominated the theory of 
international law.”). 
98 See Victoria Tin-bor Hui, Toward a Confucian Multicultural Approach to a Liberal World 
Order: Insights from Historical East Asia, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 413, 413 (2005) (“In the so-
called Age of Reason, sovereignty was understood as a principle that permitted state rulers to do 
anything in their own self-interest.  It was fair game for the strong to encroach on the weak.  In the 
eighteenth century, Prussia, Russia, and Austria carved up Poland.”). 
99 See id. (listing imperial France’s attempts to conquer Europe as an extension of French 
sovereign power); Preece, supra note 2, at 231. 
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Austria and Prussia.  That covenant embodied—or at least assumed—the 
principles of autonomous and exclusive nation-states, a concept which had 
been on the rise since the Middle Ages.100  As a marked departure from the 
medieval approach of mediating authorities such as the Holy Roman 
Empire or the Catholic Church, the Congress laid the groundwork for a 
supposedly stable system of balanced alliances exclusively between the so-
called Great Powers.101  However, the attempts by the Great Powers to 
restore those pre-revolutionary dynasties by expanding their territories led 
to the inclusion of large ethnic minorities—German, Greek, Italian, 
Serbian and Polish, among others—within their borders.  Without any 
outlet for their grievances, the minorities’ demands for representation 
turned into nationalistic revolutions, though most were successfully 
suppressed through the joint military efforts of the Great Powers.102  While 
the Congress certainly re-ordered the political map of Europe, the creation 
of the German Confederation and the retention of a divided Italy left the 
transition to a well-defined system of independent nation-states somewhat 
incomplete.103  Italian and German (excluding Austria) unification under a 
centralized government would not occur until approximately 1871,104 
though there is no doubt that by this time the European Great Powers could 
act unilaterally within their own territories without fear of reprisals, 
coercion or condemnation by external powers, let alone legal constraints. 
The concept of exclusive internal authority also suited the European 
powers because many had established—or were still establishing—vast 
colonial empires in Latin America, Africa and Asia.105  Knowing that the 
native peoples in those lands often—but of course not always—lacked one 
or more of the major attributes of “civilized” European nation-states such 
as a distinct territory, centralized government or formal external relations, 
it was easy for a European state to regard native peoples as having no legal 
                                                                                                                          
100 See Preece, supra note 2, at 231 (“At the Congress of Vienna, held from 1814–15, the 
European leadership found no reason to question national sovereignty when drawing up the European 
peace.  Indeed, external sovereignty was developed further at the Congress . . . .”).  
101 See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 73–74, 137–38 (1987) 
(marking the rise of the Great Powers leading up to the Congress of Vienna and describing the evolving 
European states system at the time as one “fashioned along lines which ensured a rough equilibrium” 
and a “balance of power”). 
102 See Hui, supra note 98, at 413 (“In the post-Napoleonic era, great powers in the Concert of 
Europe used armies to put down revolutionary movements across Europe.”). 
103 As to the exact legal and institutional details of the German Confederation, the multi-tiered 
federal entity created by the Congress of Vienna was considerably complex.  Suffice it to say, because 
the fates of the thirty-nine small principalities in the Confederation were determined to a large extent 
by Prussia and the Austrian Empire, this political body was clearly an aberration when compared to the 
ideal of well-defined and independent nation-states envisioned by Westphalian orthodoxy.  Though the 
Holy Roman Empire had fallen in 1806, even the Congress of Vienna failed to establish even a de jure 
Westphalian state system throughout Europe, nearly 150 years after the Peace which is said to have 
done so. 
104 Steiger, supra note 20, at 61. 
105 Hui, supra note 98, at 413. 
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rights which it, as a colonizing power, was bound to respect.106  In addition 
to the economic incentives of colonization, the competitive pressures from 
other European powers created a kind of arms race for exploiting local 
peoples and resources.107  Certainly not eager to encourage or create 
external institutions or legal processes that would scrutinize their 
repressive colonial practices from a humanist or religious perspective, the 
European states following the Congress largely turned away from 
continental problems in favor of expanding their economic and military 
capabilities.  As those capabilities increased, and as colonial competition 
intensified, the European powers organized themselves into an alliance 
system, hoping to ward off future conflict through a balance-of-power 
approach.  Despite the obvious flaws of this model for international peace 
and security,108 it took not one but two world wars and a genocide of 
unprecedented scale to bring those defects to the sober attention of the 
European nations. 
B.  False Historical Attribution of the Myth to Westphalia 
Even though Europe has today entirely abandoned the system of 
absolutely sovereign nation-states,109 the European influence on the 
modern international system cannot be doubted.110  To the extent that the 
European system of absolutist nation-states at some point resembled the 
theory posited by Westphalian orthodoxy, the theory surely carries some 
explanatory value, even if it simply fails to date accurately when the 
change took place or how it occurred—two highly significant flaws.  It is 
possible to imagine that the state system could exist as it does today and 
that something like Westphalian orthodoxy—call it “European 
absolutism,” for instance—could be utilized to describe accurately that 
portion of its evolution.  Yet the legal and historical literature does not 
speak of something like European absolutism; Westphalian orthodoxy 
itself is the dominant model.  So a question posed earlier still remains: 
when and how did modern scholars and policy makers, nearly all of whom 
seem to recite Westphalian orthodoxy as if it were unquestionably true, 
                                                                                                                          
106 Kelly, supra note 73, at 385–86. 
107 Id. at 383. 
108 See Hui, supra note 98, at 414 (noting the excessive death and destruction in Europe in the 
centuries prior to the Cold War, rejecting the explanatory hypothesis that Europeans as a people are 
“uniquely belligerent,” and instead comparing the high frequency of devastating warfare in Europe to 
that of China between 656 and 221 BCE, when the Chinese system most resembled the early modern 
European state-system and, not coincidentally, Sun Tzu wrote his famous work, The Art of War). 
109 If anyone doubts this assessment, one need only take a close look at the history of the 
European Union as a robust supranational system for economic and diplomatic cooperation, as well as 
the functioning of the European Court of Human Rights, easily the most successful regional human 
rights regime in the world. 
110 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 73, at 391 (“As the creator of state sovereignty, Europe was also, in 
fact, the chief exporter of the notion of state sovereignty to the rest of the world.”). 
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come to believe that the Peace of Westphalia marked that kind of decisive 
shift in the legal and political relations of Western powers? 
To a certain extent, Westphalia may have historical appeal because 
certain aspects of the treaties relate to the recognition of European nations 
and others pertain to the semi-constitutional relationship between the 
Empire and the German monarchs.111  In addition, as has been noted 
previously, the Peace did mark one event in a progressive series from 
decentralized power to absolutist nation-states,112 though the latter 
probably reached its zenith sometime in the late nineteenth or first half of 
the twentieth century.  It is undoubtedly tempting for a proponent to state 
unequivocally the origin of a complex historical and legal process, 
particularly in light of the fact that such processes often overlap and to 
delineate stark paradigm shifts is to simplify otherwise immensely 
complex systems.113  Furthermore, when the proponent has taken it upon 
himself or herself not only to describe but to defend the present system, the 
temptation to enhance its legitimacy by ante-dating a definitive point of 
origin may be irresistible. 
An oft-cited work of scholarship on the meaning of Westphalia 
appears to have provided the proponents of the myth with an intellectual 
starting point, even though the original author was far more equivocal in 
his assessment than its proponents turned out to be.  In 1948, with the 
tercentenary of the Peace approaching, Leo Gross published an article 
examining the significance of Westphalia in the development of the 
modern state system.114  In that work, Gross noted a common thread 
running between the Peace and later international instruments such as the 
League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations, namely those 
provisions calling for the protection of individual rights and the prohibition 
of discrimination against minorities.115  Gross also emphasized the novelty 
of the Peace treaties’ terms for multilateral pacific settlement of disputes 
and that, though Westphalia helped in replacing the transcendental 
authorities and “divorcing [international law] from any particular religious 
background . . . [i]t would seem hazardous, however, to regard the 
Settlement of Westphalia and the work of Grotius as more than stages in 
the gradual, though by no means uniform, process which antedates and 
continues beyond the year 1648.”116  As to drawing conclusions, Gross also 
explicitly warned that his own arguments were “necessarily tentative and 
                                                                                                                          
111 Beaulac, supra note 5, at 166–68. 
112 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
113 See Beaulac, supra note 5, at 175–76 (discussing the tendency for historians to “ante-date the 
beginning of pivotal phenomena such as state sovereignty” for that reason). 
114 See Gross, supra note 2, at 21 (“In view of this continued influence of the Peace of 
Westphalia, it may not be amiss to discuss briefly its character, background and implications.”). 
115 Id. at 22–24. 
116 Id. at 25–27 (emphasis added). 
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intended to indicate rather than to solve the problems connected with the 
rise of the modern state system and the particular role of the Peace of 
Westphalia in this vital process.”117 
Later scholarship on the topic would not share Gross’s original 
cautious assessment.118  Instead, much attention was paid to several now-
famous passages that suggested Gross had conclusively determined 
Westphalia to be the definitive origin of the modern system of absolutely 
sovereign and independent nation-states.119  In promoting this narrow and 
distorted account of history, Gross’s contemporaries and those who were to 
follow could justify their opposition to mid-twentieth-century attempts to 
establish legal mechanisms for the enforcement of human rights.  That is to 
say, Gross, perhaps inadvertently, provided such opponents with an 
additional arrow in their quiver; not only was legal protection of 
international human rights a bad idea generally, it was antithetical to the 
fundamental principles of the modern sovereign state system that had 
existed for three hundred years.120  Unfortunately, as should become clear 
shortly, the latter basis, descriptive but inaccurate, has come to replace 
genuine normative debate over the optimal balance between domestic 
power and human rights enforcement. 
IV.  THE MYTH’S IMPACT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 
Regardless of the extent to which scholars of law and international 
relations later (mis)used Gross’s writing, the national sovereignty’s myth 
played a critical role in retarding the progress of human rights enforcement 
following the Second World War.121  In this Part, for purposes of 
foundation, I shall briefly describe the historical and political background 
that led up to the formation of the United Nations system.  From that 
                                                                                                                          
117 Id. at 30. 
118 See, e.g., Eric Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order, 6 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 269, 271–72 & n.15 (1978) (labeling Gross’s conception of the era of the Peace an 
“accurate[] characteriz[ation] as the beginning of a new world order”). 
119 Two particular passages have been especially prominent: “The Peace of Westphalia, for better 
or worse, marks the end of an epoch and the opening of another.  It represents the majestic portal which 
leads from the old into the new world.”  Gross, supra note 2, at 28.  “In the political field [Westphalia] 
marked man’s abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical structure of society and his option for a new 
system characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory, 
equal to one another, and free from any external earthly authority.”  Id. at 28–29. 
120 It is important to understand that Gross’s supposed attribution did not mark the starting point 
of the myth’s influence, but rather it helped to solidify the link between the Peace of Westphalia in 
history to the pre-existing belief, held by some, that absolute sovereignty was a kind of basic norm in 
international affairs.  The myth had force and effect in international law and political relations well 
before it became conceptually anchored to Westphalia.  For example, while a defendant at the 
Nuremberg trials in 1945–1946, Hermann Goering defended the premeditated horror of the Holocaust 
against his critics by declaring: “But that was our right!  We were a sovereign State and that was 
strictly our business.”  PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
202–04 (2d ed. 2003). 
121 Id. at 160. 
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foundation, I shall review the effect of the Westphalian myth on two 
related events of the immediate post-war era: the drafting and adoption of 
Chapters I and VII of the UN Charter, and the conversion of an 
international bill of rights into the Universal Declaration.  Those events, 
significantly altered by the rhetorical force implicit in the term sovereignty, 
illustrate the crippling and lasting influence the Westphalian myth has on 
legal progress for human rights. 
During World War II, the Allied powers employed extensive rhetoric 
of individual rights and social progress in order to convince nations to form 
a coalition against the Axis, most centrally in the creation of the Atlantic 
Charter.122  In particular, the Atlantic Charter pledged the Allied nations to 
promoting self-government, economic and labor rights, human rights, and 
a redesigned global legal order.123  As a result, many smaller nations and 
activists believed that human rights and the protection of minorities would 
take center stage in the new United Nations system.124  In fact, the Soviet 
Union, the United States, and Great Britain seemed to reconfirm those 
ambitions with the adoption of the Declaration of the United Nations on 
the first day of January 1942, which stated that its signatories would adhere 
to the principles in the Atlantic Charter.125  The leading diplomatic 
representative for the United States, Undersecretary of State Sumner 
Welles, was instrumental in directing U.S. policy in favor of human rights 
norms.  When he was assigned to head the State Department’s Special 
Subcommittee on International Organization, Welles recognized that the 
post-war planners would face a crucial question: “How do we limit 
sovereignty?”126 
The first real opportunity for significant post-war planning came at the 
Dumbarton Oaks conference in late summer and fall 1944.  There, with 
victory in Europe seemingly in hand, the four leading Allied powers—
Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China—met to 
decide the new course for the post-war international system.  By that time, 
Undersecretary Welles had resigned his post and had been replaced in his 
advisory role to F.D.R. by the far more conservative Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull.  During the negotiations, China surprised the other three 
Allied powers by openly expressing their willingness to “cede as much of 
its sovereign power as may be required,” and they expected that Britain, 
                                                                                                                          
122 See id. at 137–40, 154–55 (detailing the effects of the Atlantic Charter upon small nations, 
oppressed peoples, and democratic movements). 
123 See id. at 138–39 (describing these portions of the Atlantic Charter). 
124 Id. at 139. 
125 Id. at 140. 
126 Id. at 157–59 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Franklin Roosevelt Library, Sumner 
Welles Papers, Box 189, P-IO, Document 3, untitled, 31 July 1942). 
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the United States, and the Soviets would follow suit.127  Understandably 
fearing that placing too much emphasis on human rights would encourage 
scrutiny of their own domestic practices, the Soviet Union, the United 
States, and Great Britain all agreed that human rights language—let alone a 
legal regime for enforcement—would be excluded from the new universal 
organization.128  The Chinese proposal for granting the United Nations the 
power to intervene into the internal affairs of member states was rejected 
by the other three Allied powers outright.129  One alternative the United 
States delegation suggested would have included two Charter provisions, 
one obligating the member states to respect human rights in their domestic 
legal systems and another empowering the United Nations to investigate 
allegations that a member state had failed in these obligations, but the 
Soviet Union and Great Britain blocked that initiative as well.130  By 
October, when the Dumbarton Oaks conference ended, no provision for 
United Nations enforcement of human rights of any kind could be found 
within the agreement.  In fact, six months later, in April 1945, at the 
commencement of the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization in San Francisco, the four leading Allied powers—now 
referred to as the Four Sponsoring governments—proposed a series of 
amendments to their Dumbarton Oaks framework, including a new 
paragraph to be found in Chapter I, Article 2 of the UN Charter:  
Nothing contained in this Charter shall authorize the 
Organization to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned or 
shall require the members to submit such matters to 
settlement under this Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of Chapter VIII, Section B.131 
In order to understand the significance of the Four Sponsoring 
governments’ Chapter I, Article 2 proposal, a review of the UN Charter’s 
provisions for enforcement under Chapter VII is essential.  Meeting in 
separate conference delegations that paralleled the final structure of the 
Charter, the representatives to the San Francisco conference in 
Commission III decided to vest responsibility for peace and security 
actions in the Security Council, operating under the assumption that any 
                                                                                                                          
127 Id. at 161 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting T.V. Soong, speech of 9 June 1942, in 
Document 26831-11, “Public Statements by Chinese Leaders on International Organization,” from the 
British Foreign Office in NANZ, EA 2, 1945/6b, File 111/8/8(1)). 
128 LAUREN, supra note 120, at 162–63. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 163. 
131 UNITED NATIONS INFO. ORG., Amendments Proposed by the Governments of the United States, 
The United Kingdom, The Soviet Union and China, in 3 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, 1945, at 622, 623 (1945) 
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such measures required the unanimous approval of the great power nations.  
In the first instance, Article 39 of the Charter was written to give the 
Security Council the exclusive authority to determine what actions 
constitute a breach or threat to peace,132 and for instances in which military 
forces are required, such forces were to be provided by the member states, 
held “immediately available” for the Security Council’s command.133  
Short of the deployment of forces, Chapter VI of the Charter permitted 
referrals of disputes to the Security Council and authorized the Council to 
investigate such disputes and to recommend procedures for pacific 
settlement.134  However—and this point is crucial to understanding the 
meaning of the United Nations’ enforcement powers—there is no 
provision in the Charter which obligates or even authorizes the 
organization to intervene in the event of widespread or systemic human 
rights atrocities committed by a state against its citizens.135 
The delegates to Commission I at the San Francisco conference 
understood these Chapter VII enforcement powers because Commission III 
had already accepted the basic structure initially proposed at Dumbarton 
Oaks.136  Commission I was assigned the task of considering amendments 
to the first two chapters of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement, or what would 
eventually become the UN Charter’s preamble, Chapter I: Purposes and 
Principles and Chapter II: Membership.  The Four Sponsoring 
governments’ amendment to Chapter I, Article 2 was eventually to become 
Article 2(7) of Chapter I of the Charter, or what is known commonly as the 
“domestic jurisdiction clause.” 
The travaux preparatoires of the Charter shed light on the origin of 
that clause, and some inferences may be drawn as to the rhetoric used and 
values to which the delegates appealed in their debates, though the 
documents themselves are largely limited to minutes taken from meetings 
and unfortunately do not include verbatim transcripts of the delegates’ 
exchanges.  Commission I representatives had the Dumbarton Oaks 
framework at hand, which provided the basic structure for the new 
organization.  Debate over the preamble and Chapter I, purposes and 
principles, was delegated to Committee 1 of Commission I, and a good 
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authority, though such actions are incumbent upon a finding, under article 39, of a threat to peace, 
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V.B. 
136 UNITED NATIONS INFO. ORG., Supplement to Report of Rapporteur, Committee I/1, to 
Commission I (Doc. 944, I/1/34 (1), June 13) Chapter II, Article 8, in 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNCIO, 
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deal of its work in May and early June 1945 consisted of considering and 
approving small proposed amendments to those three sections.137  
However, even though the drafting subcommittee of Committee 1 had 
produced complete drafts of those sections by June 9, 1945, the Four 
Sponsoring governments’ Chapter I, Article 2 proposal was left for 
exclusive consideration later in the committee’s agenda.138   
In one of the travaux’s few documents opposing the amendments 
offered by the Four Sponsoring governments, Norway’s representative, Dr. 
Arnold Raestad, objected that the domestic jurisdiction clause would 
impose “a very grave limitation” on the Security Council’s ability to 
mediate peaceful settlements.139  In its view, the member states in nearly 
any such dispute could assert that the necessary concessions were within 
their domestic jurisdiction and were thus beyond the United Nations’ 
competence.140  The Norwegian delegation noted that even the Council of 
the League of Nations was authorized to offer conciliation for domestic 
conflicts, and it suggested that the United Nations’ efforts for peace could 
not be realized “without a certain willingness on the part of the member 
states to recede from rigid concepts of national sovereignty.”141 
On June 14, 1945, the Australian delegation put forth a memorandum 
in support of a minor change to the amendment by the Four Sponsoring 
governments, one which illustrates some of the rhetorical devices 
employed in favor of the domestic jurisdiction clause.142  The Australian 
memorandum was in almost full agreement with the Four Sponsoring 
governments’ amendment, and it posed the question of whether the Charter 
should contain a prohibition on the United Nations’ intervention into 
matters of domestic jurisdiction.143  The answer to that question, the 
Australian delegation argued, should be affirmative: “No [international] 
organisation should be permitted to intervene in those domestic matters in 
which, by definition, international law permits each state entire liberty of 
action.”144  Further, in asserting its main point of contention—that the 
Security Council could be used as a tool by stronger nations for extorting 
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concessions from less powerful ones—the Australian memorandum 
implicitly revealed its authors’ hidden assumptions about sovereignty: 
The freedom of action which international law has 
always recognised in matters of domestic jurisdiction [ought 
not to become subject] to the full jurisdiction of the Security 
Council. . . . By definition, a state is free, within the limited 
sphere of domestic jurisdiction, to adopt whatever policy it 
thinks best.145 
On the afternoon of June 14, 1945, Committee 1 met in the Veterans 
Building in San Francisco to discuss the proposed amendment offered by 
the Australian delegation.146  The majority of the discussion concerned 
Australia’s proposal for the exception to the domestic jurisdiction clause; 
only a few statements from various delegations addressed any alternative 
to its substance.  The delegate of China was the first to speak in opposition, 
noting that in his view any limitation on the United Nations’ enforcement 
powers could undermine the organization’s primary purpose of 
maintaining peace and security, and he asserted that those powers ought 
not to be “hampered” by the domestic jurisdiction clause.147  The delegate 
from Great Britain spoke in support of the Australian delegation’s version 
of the clause, explicitly recognizing that “certain states were jealous of 
their rights of national jurisdiction” and arguing that the United Nations 
could not interfere in the internal affairs of states “until and unless” a 
dispute threatened to become a war.148  A representative of France 
followed the British delegate, reminding the committee that his 
government had originally proposed an amendment to the enforcement 
powers chapter to allow UN intervention in cases where “the clear 
violation of essential liberties and of human rights constitute[d] in itself a 
threat capable of compromising peace.”149  That amendment, the French 
delegate said, was in recognition of the historical experience of Nazism 
and the Holocaust, which had illustrated the desirability of international 
intervention for the purpose of protecting “certain unfortunate 
minorities.”150  Shortly before the final roll call vote was taken, the 
Norwegian delegate, reiterating his government’s earlier concerns, 
expressed agreement with the delegates from China and France.151 
Before the close of the June 14 afternoon meeting at 6 p.m., delegate 
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John Foster Dulles requested permission to speak on behalf of the domestic 
jurisdiction clause.152  The committee reconvened at 8:30 the next evening, 
and the chair called on Dulles to deliver his presentation in support of the 
proposed amendment to Article 2 of Chapter I.153  Dulles first noted that 
the Four Sponsoring governments had proposed the amendment to alter the 
Dumbarton Oaks agreement in view of the “change in the character” of the 
United Nations since the initiation of the San Francisco conference.154  The 
expansion of the organization’s competence to economic and social 
matters, he said, “constituted a great advance, but it also engendered 
special problems.”155  Specifically, Dulles said, while the Economic and 
Social Council—recently made a principal organ of the new 
organization—was given a mandate to raise standards of living and foster 
employment and other economic goals, the domestic jurisdiction clause 
was written to ensure that no member of the Security Council would be 
permitted to “go behind the governments in order to impose its desires.”156  
Dulles opposed a proposal empowering the new International Court of 
Justice to interpret when a matter was essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a member state, and he concluded by saying that future 
generations would be grateful to the committee’s adoption of a simple, 
absolute rule prohibiting interference in states’ domestic affairs.157  Three 
days later, a report by Committee 1 of Commission I recorded the approval 
of the Four Sponsoring governments’ amendment, explicitly 
acknowledging that “[s]tated positively the [new] paragraph means: (1) 
that each state has entire liberty of action in matters which are essentially 
within its domestic jurisdiction . . . .”158 
Dulles’s reference to the new organization’s “change in character” 
between Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco was undoubtedly reflective of 
the influence exerted by many nations and activists during the latter 
conference, the first time anyone other than the elite corps of diplomats 
from the Allied powers had a chance to express their preferences for the 
new international system.  Extensive lobbying by many individuals and 
groups, all of whom having formed an expectation that the United Nations’ 
structure would conform to the cosmopolitan ideals of the stated Allied 
objectives, had led to the inclusion of human rights clauses in the 
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Charter—most prominently in the preamble and the elevation of the 
Economic and Social Council—as well as to the creation of the trusteeship 
system and a commission to create an international bill of rights.159  Thus, 
after months of negotiations, the UN Charter came to reflect both the new 
norm of human rights as well as the traditional protection of internal 
sovereignty,160 most conspicuously in the final version of its domestic 
jurisdiction clause, Article 2(7),161 which was recognized even at the time 
as “potentially the most substantial limitation that is to be found anywhere 
in the whole Charter upon the activity of the United Nations.”162  In fact, 
legal scholar Phillip C. Jessup had anticipated the ideological conflict 
between sovereignty and human rights enforcement even before the San 
Francisco conference began: “We have taught the layman to worship the 
arch-fiction of the sovereign state,” he wrote, “and thereby have built a 
Maginot line against the invasion of new ideas in the international 
world.”163 
The myth of sovereignty continued to exert its corrosive influence 
when it came to fleshing out the decision to draft and adopt an 
international bill of rights.  During the drafting attempts led by the 
Commission on Human Rights, a primary question was whether any 
enumeration of such rights would be succeeded by a multilateral 
convention creating binding legal obligations upon its signatories.164  A 
major influence upon Eleanor Roosevelt—who chaired the commission—
during the implementation debates came from the Truman administration, 
whose Democratic party had to rely on votes from representatives in the 
Jim Crow-era South, many of whom insisted that any cessation of national 
or state sovereignty in this way would be tantamount to introducing anti-
lynching legislation and could “ultimately lead to the United Nations 
investigating the condition of ‘negroes in Alabama.’”165  Roosevelt 
                                                                                                                          
159 LAUREN, supra note 120, at 188–90, 209; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE 
NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 10–18 (2001) 
(explaining the expectations of small nations and colonized peoples with respect to the international 
system and detailing their lobbying efforts). 
160 GLENDON, supra note 159, at 18–19; Preece, supra note 2, at 230. 
161 The final version of Article 2(7) reads: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII. 
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
162 LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 23 (2d rev. 
ed. 1949). 
163 LAUREN, supra note 120, at 191–92 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Phillip Jessup, 
as quoted in Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, International Safeguard of Human 
Rights, at 16). 
164 LAUREN, supra note 120, at 223; GLENDON, supra note 159, at 84–87. 
165 ANDERSON, supra note 152, at 2–3 (quoting Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the General 
Assembly Delegation, October 28, 1946, US/A/M/(CHR)/10, Box 60, File “US/A/M/(CHR)/I-32,” 
 
 2009] LIMPING TOWARD ELYSIUM 1773 
received specific instructions from Durward Sandifer in the U.S. State 
Department that discussions of legal enforcement of human rights 
provisions “should be kept on a tentative level and should not involve any 
commitments by [the U.S.] Government.”166 
Great Britain and the Soviets had also lobbied since Dumbarton Oaks 
for a non-binding declaration, or no declaration at all, for similar reasons 
relating to their respective practices of operating a global colonial empire 
and a murderous totalitarian regime.167  During those deliberations, the 
Soviet representative warned against “cross[ing] the border which divides 
international from internal law—the border which divides the inter-
relationships of governments from the field where the sovereign rights of 
nations must prevail.”168  After much discussion, Roosevelt and 
representatives from Great Britain and the Soviet Union persuaded their 
fellow members from smaller nations that a binding convention would be 
inappropriate and that the commission would work on a declaration only, 
with a convention to follow later, adopted into law at the initiation of the 
member governments.169  Ultimately, the document the commission 
drafted, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was entirely 
aspirational. 
The failure of the United Nations system to include legal, military or 
other coercive capabilities to prevent such atrocities was an indirect result 
of the myth of Westphalia.  The political force of the proponents of the 
Westphalian myth had a perceptible influence on the outcome of events at 
the founding of the United Nations system.  Though it is not certain that 
any San Francisco delegate ever explicitly invoked the term Westphalia, 
debate over the domestic jurisdiction clause was premised upon the very 
“definition” of international law as imposing no obligation on a state with 
respect to its own citizens, a position clearly recalling Bentham’s 
reinterpretation of the term.170  Moreover, just as the concept of “states’ 
rights” had been used by American southerners for over a century to justify 
continued racial oppression, the great power nations used sovereignty as a 
talisman to undercut the international bill of rights, converting it into a 
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declaration of no legal force or effect. 
It was clear, even to observers at the time, that only the less-powerful 
nations—not so obsessed with protecting their new presumed status as 
absolute sovereign states—were willing to accept that the idea of 
sovereignty was merely one way of distributing legal authority and not the 
only way; the most powerful nations could not be persuaded to consider 
that possibility.171  From a strictly political perspective, this disparity of 
power was a primary reason the myth took on its persuasive force in the 
negotiations.  Had the roles been reversed and the powerful nations had 
argued for significant limitations on domestic powers in order to prevent 
human rights abuses by less-powerful nations, any appeal the smaller 
nations made to ethereal notions of “absolute sovereignty” would have 
seemed like feeble cries of last resort by petty tyrants bent on retaining 
their impunity to mistreat and murder their own citizens.  But because an 
international order that did not include Great Britain, the United States and 
the Soviet Union was not politically feasible or practical, sovereignty 
operated in the background as an assumed principle that had to be 
overcome—when it was overcome at all—only with considerable effort.172  
As such, a delegate’s appeal to sovereignty gave his or her argument the air 
of force and historical legitimacy while concealing the real motivation, the 
retention of political power.  As a result, the less-powerful nations and 
others inclined to promote human rights were forced to accept the Charter 
in its present form, retaining a structure, function and series of limitations 
for essentially domestic matters that shape the distribution of power—as 
well as the ability for the United Nations to respond to human rights and 
humanitarian crises—to the present day. 
V.  FAILINGS OF THE WESTPHALIAN MYTH: NON-INTERVENTION IN 
BURMA 
A.  Overview of the Crisis and the International Response 
The enduring inaccuracy of the traditional Westphalian story has 
produced a multitude of consequences in the international legal and 
political system, some immediate and some more remote.  As 
demonstrated in the two previous Parts, the grounding of the current state 
system’s legitimacy on questionable historical footing has produced a 
nearly unexamined orthodoxy in the academy, as well as an early 
codification of the internal sovereignty principle in the founding document 
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of the world’s only universal political organization.  As a result, instead of 
governments, activists and theorists asking themselves how best to 
promote and protect human rights as a first-order priority, the inquiry has 
become: How can one secure marginal human rights progress without 
disturbing the seemingly indispensable foundation of the entire edifice?  
This constraint retards efforts that would otherwise result in improved 
human rights treatment and prosperity for literally billions of individuals 
on the planet.  Amazingly enough, this breaking effect even persists in the 
face of acute crisis, when peoples—hopelessly out-matched—are forced to 
confront oppression, illness or mass violence with little or no help from the 
industrialized portion of humanity.  Recent events in a segregated and 
terrorized segment of Asia will serve to illustrate the obstructions the 
Westphalian mythology poses to human rights and humanitarian concerns.  
But first, a review of those recent events would be beneficial. 
The largest nation-state in Southeast Asia by territory is Burma, 
officially known by its government as the Union of Myanmar.173  The 
country holds rich mineral reserves as well as significant offshore oil and 
gas deposits.174  It is a member of the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (“ASEAN”),175 and though the military-controlled economy 
includes revenues from those natural resources, illegal narcotics and some 
foreign investment, because of corruption and poor management, Burma 
remains one of the poorest nations in Asia with respect to per capita 
income.176  In addition to the majority Burman people, the country contains 
several ethnic minority populations, though in terms of spiritual culture, 
nearly the entire nation practices Buddhism.177  All news media are strictly 
controlled by the government.178 
Burma is a former colony of Great Britain that gained its independence 
in 1948 and had a democratic government until 1962, when General Ne 
Win seized power in a coup.179  That military regime controlled the nation 
until a currency devaluation triggered a widespread pro-democracy 
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movement in 1987–88 that destroyed the savings of many Burmese 
citizens.180  A national uprising, consisting of hundreds of thousands of 
anti-government protesters, occurred on August 8, 1988, but that 
movement was brutally suppressed by the military, killing at least 3,000 
persons in the process.181  The first multi-party election in thirty years was 
held in 1990, and Nobel laureate Dr. Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the 
National League for Democracy (“NLD”), won a huge parliamentary 
majority.182  However, General Saw Maung—who had seized power in a 
1988 coup—never permitted the NLD or any other civilian parties to 
govern according to any free election.  General Maung was succeeded in 
1992 by Senior General Than Shwe, who currently is chairperson of the 
State Peace and Development Council (“SPDC”), the twelve-member band 
of senior generals that leads the military regime.183  The 75-year-old 
General Shwe has consistently refused to transfer power or even to make 
marginal democratic reforms.  Moreover, in 2004, he sacked a moderate 
member of his own junta, former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, for allegedly 
supporting reconciliation talks with the NLD and Dr. Aung San Suu Kyi, 
who was originally put under house arrest in 1990 and remains so to this 
day.184 
Due to its spiritual influences, the Burmese monks are the Buddhist 
nation’s most respected faction and serve as leaders in communities.185  
The monasteries offer free education even to those citizens who do not 
ultimately become monks.186  In addition to simple religious or ceremonial 
services, the monks dole out a kind of spiritual credit to those who provide 
various handouts, as the monks are not permitted to accept donations of or 
even handle money.187  A monk’s most potent admonition comes when he 
refuses to accept a handout, a signal that the donor has been denied the 
opportunity to earn the coveted spiritual credit.188  Such denials are not the 
only form of censure displayed by the Burmese monks; they have a long 
history of activism against unpopular or immoral actions by a governing 
authority, including conducting protests against the British colonial 
occupation in the 1930s.189  The monks’ protest role relates to their former 
function as intermediaries between the people and the Burmese monarchy 
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through the late nineteenth century.  Monks are said to command 
considerable moral authority, even among the military, and can encourage 
many other Burmese to join a protest march if they rise in support of it.190 
Already facing extreme conditions of poverty from the corruption in 
the government, the regime’s decision on August 15, 2007 to increase the 
price of fuel hit the Burmese people hard.191  Essential commodities such 
as rice and cooking oil also rose, sparking a 400-person protest by pro-
democracy activists on August 19.192  Though that initial march was 
quickly dispelled by the military, protests around the nation continued, 
particularly after a significant number of Burmese monks joined on 
September 5.193  The following day, monks took several government 
officials hostage and publicly demanded that the regime apologize to the 
people by September 17.194  When the deadline passed, tens of thousands 
of monks began daily protests in earnest and withdrew religious services 
from the military and their families.195  On September 21, an organizing 
group called the Alliance of All Burmese Buddhist Monks came forth to 
coordinate the protests and issued public statements declaring the regime 
an “enemy of the people” and that protests would continue until they had 
“wiped the military dictatorship from the land.”196  The monks were joined 
in the largest protests—in the city of Rangoon and elsewhere—by top 
members of the NLD, small ethnic groups, and ordinary Burmese citizens, 
and one rally linked the protests to Burma’s pro-democracy movement by 
marching past the house of Aung San Suu Kyi.197 
Apart from the arrests made during the 400-person march on August 
19, the military leadership took no action during the first week of large-
scale protests.198  Then, on September 25, the military issued a warning 
that action would be taken if the protests did not cease, and the next day it 
imposed a total daylight curfew by introducing hundreds of troops and riot 
police into the streets.199  Clashes between the military and the protestors 
erupted immediately, and by September 27, the junta acknowledged killing 
nine people, though other observers noted that the count was probably far 
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higher.200  The junta made thousands of arrests in the days following, 
rounding up monks to be held in makeshift detention centers before being 
transported north to prison camps, where many monks remain.201  News 
reporters stationed in and around Burma also reported rumors that the 
military was using a Rangoon crematorium to perform night-time 
incinerations of the bodies of protestors killed as a result of the 
crackdown.202  A B.B.C. reporter who witnessed the events, attempting to 
estimate the loss of life, admitted, “[t]he truth is that we may never know 
exactly how many people died and were detained.”203 
In a report to the United Nations Human Rights Council, special 
rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro was also informed of the acts of 
incineration in the Rangoon crematorium as part of a five-day visit to 
Burma in the wake of the protests, though he was prevented from visiting 
the incineration site.204  Pinheiro confirmed the deaths of thirty-one 
persons, listed seventy-four missing persons and reiterated stories of 
soldiers driving amidst crowds of protestors, firing live ammunition and, 
on two occasions, fatally shooting young boys in cold blood.205  The report 
also contained information about large-capacity detention centers lacking 
sanitation, guarded by dogs and holding children, monks and pregnant 
women who were alternatively confined and tortured.206  Pinheiro’s report 
was part of the Security Council’s demand for an investigation into the 
incidents, and it called for a “genuine dialogue” between the junta and the 
pro-democracy elements as well as the release of political prisoners.207  A 
statement by the Security Council expressed “regret[] [at] the slow rate of 
progress” toward those goals, and UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari was in the 
process of negotiating another visit sometime before mid-April 2008, 
though the Burmese leadership stated that any time earlier than that would 
not be convenient.208 
In terms of national and regional responses, the United States and the 
European Union enacted limited sanctions, though taken individually 
neither power carries much weight with the Burmese military regime.209  
Initially, the ASEAN strongly condemned the junta’s violent repression of 
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the protests,210 but by early December 2007, the organization had backed 
off its original stance and ignored the requests by the United States and 
European Union for diplomatic isolation and an economic embargo.211  
China, seen as Burma’s closest strong-power ally in Asia, also publicly 
called on the regime to put a stop to the violence, but as B.B.C. News 
noted, China “has maintained its traditional reluctance to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of other countries.”212  India and Russia—the other 
regional powers with influence over the regime—apparently have adopted 
China’s posture.213 
B.  Westphalian Orthodoxy’s Influence on Intervention in Burma 
The persistence of the myth of Westphalia helps to perpetuate the 
autocratic Burmese junta and their gross violations of human rights.  This 
it does in several ways—systemically, institutionally and psychologically.  
The political history of the United Nations system demonstrates the way in 
which the Great Powers enshrined the exclusivity principle of sovereignty 
into the organization’s charter, limiting its enforcement powers to actions 
that threaten only international peace and security.214  With the 
gravitational distribution of global power centered almost solely at the 
level of the nation-state, and with the understanding that something like 
Westphalian state sovereignty still persists to protect states from legal 
sanctions over internal matters, states pursue domestic policies that 
undermine their moral and political authority on matters of humanitarian 
concern.  Finally, the psychological force of national sovereignty—
supposedly given descriptive credibility by questionable references to 
European history—tends to smother frank discussions of diplomacy by 
falsely presenting exclusive and absolute sovereignty as a desirable feature 
in international law. 
At the broadest level, the United Nations system was unable to prevent 
the brutal repression of the recent democratic protests in Burma, or to exert 
any kind of real pressure to bring down the ruling junta, largely because it 
was not designed to do so.  In the first instance, the UN Charter prohibits 
states from using force or the threat of force against other states unless in 
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self-defense or, in practice, authorized in advance by the United Nations.215  
Thus, enforcement actions on humanitarian matters that do not threaten 
another member state are relegated to the purview of the Security Council 
through its Chapter VII powers.216  However, two broad provisos have 
historically limited the council’s discretion in such matters: the need to 
show a threat to international peace and security,217 and the necessity of 
securing the offending state’s consent before engaging peacekeeping 
troops into its territory.218  Both limitations can be seen as indirect effects 
of the myth of exclusive and absolute sovereignty; the first concerns the 
proper role of the United Nations as determined by its founders—
particularly the Great Powers—and the second clearly speaks to the 
persistent concerns of what types of situations are matters of exclusive 
domestic jurisdiction.219 
There is no doubt that the protests in August and September of 2007 
related most directly to the internal organization and operation of the 
Burmese people’s government.  As such, the protests and their suppression 
probably did not threaten Burma’s neighbors directly, and thus no other 
state could reasonably claim self-defense as a justification for intervention.  
By the same token, even an active Security Council would have difficulty 
making the case that the situation in Burma directly threatened 
international peace and security, though it has occasionally relaxed this 
rule for responses to humanitarian crises, such as in Southern Rhodesia, 
South Africa, Somalia and Haiti.220  However, the Security Council was 
not active in this case.  As with a host of international human rights 
challenges, the Security Council has delegated the matter to a charter 
organ, the Human Rights Council, which concerns itself with fact-finding 
and diplomacy and clearly has no capacity to force an end to the military’s 
violent oppression, detention and murder of its citizens.221  The fact that 
such delegations are made, even in times of acute humanitarian crisis, is 
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itself a sign of the systemic results of a wildly erroneous belief in the 
propriety of exclusive domestic jurisdiction over such matters.  It is 
therefore no wonder that telephone and other calls from the Burmese 
people to the United Nations during the brutal military response fell on 
deaf ears.222 
Relating to the distribution of authority—or lack thereof—at the 
international level, there is the fact that nation-states have responded, as 
the recipients of the vast majority of global political power, by pursuing 
domestic policies that weaken their ability to pressure other nations on 
human rights and humanitarian issues.  By continuing to follow 
unwaveringly the norm of national sovereignty—implicitly through their 
actions or, on occasion, explicitly through public statements—nation-states 
can assume a kind of impunity with respect to domestic policies, partially 
because they know there is almost never any higher legal institution 
authorized to restrict such action.223  The Bush administration in the United 
States, though admittedly one of the most vocal in calling for some kind of 
political and economic sanctions against the Burmese military government, 
suffered the effects of such policies by seeing its moral and political capital 
depleted through various domestic activities.224  More importantly, 
however, the frequent use of national sovereignty as a defense for domestic 
policies converts the descriptive accuracy of the concept into a normative 
principle, one that is identified with institutional or national behavior.  
Thus, attempts to appeal to other norms—such as humanitarian or 
democratic interests—subsequent to the repeated invocations of 
sovereignty are derided as hypocritical by the actor making the appeals.225  
This increased probability of being regarded as insincere in one’s 
                                                                                                                          
222 See McGeown, supra note 184 (“While they might not favour sanctions, the people of Burma 
definitely want the international community’s help in other ways.  Many of those who telephoned the 
UN during the crackdown asked why no-one was sending a peacekeeping force. . . . ‘The international 
community did nothing to stop a three-day killing spree,’ one woman said.  ‘That was when I realised 
we were on our own.’”). 
223 Of course, not all nation-states act with such impunity, and others who might be inclined to do 
so can sometimes be persuaded by recourse to certain types of political, economic or moral coercion, 
the varying effectiveness of which I will not attempt to address here.  Suffice it to say that the 
assurances of national sovereignty provide states with substantial legal cover, and they are particularly 
likely to embolden governments that are not responsive to such non-legal forms of condemnation. 
224 See Mydans, supra note 211 (“In what seems to be a sign of the United States’ waning 
influence in the region, China, India and Myanmar’s Southeast Asian neighbors have brushed aside 
Washington’s calls for an economic embargo and the diplomatic isolation of the junta.”). 
225 China, for instance, has issued counter-attacks in its state-run media to reports by the United 
States detailing Chinese human rights abuses.  See, e.g., US Human Rights Hypocrisy Attacked, CHINA 
DAILY, May 22, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, CHIDLY File.  Such counter-attacks have 
included condemnations against the United States’ treatment of Iraqi prisoners and have stated that 
U.S. actions “have prompted China to suspend its human rights dialogue with the United States.”  Id.  
Interestingly, the same report from the China Daily also contains the following statement, supposedly 
made by Dong Yunhu, the Vice President of the China Society for Human Rights Studies: “The United 
States should stop interfering in other countries’ internal affairs by using human rights, and return to an 
equal dialogue on human rights.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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international affairs leads nation-states such as China never to invoke 
humanitarian interests and to concern itself solely with protecting its image 
as a defender of nationalism and, concurrently, with reaping the benefits of 
doing so.226 
Perhaps the most potent effects of the myth of Westphalia are 
psychological in nature, as it distorts every discussion about whether 
humanitarian intervention in Burma was or is appropriate.  The 
consequences of the myth are therefore registered all the way up through 
national policy, institutional capacity and, ultimately, to the basic structure 
of the international system.  Even in the case of a totally failed and 
illegitimate government such as Burma, the presumption in international 
law and diplomacy is that the state is recognized as still entitled to the 
privileges of even the most just democracies.  Of course, under the United 
Nations system, a government can forfeit such privileges if it becomes a 
threat to international peace and security, but absent that extreme 
circumstance, the ruling domestic authority is protected by its inherent 
sovereign rights.227  Such was the case with Burma, where the international 
community gave a large outcry against the military crackdown but no legal 
sanction or tactical support of any kind followed as a result.228  Insofar as 
decision-makers are aware that the concept of sovereignty informs and 
pervades every aspect of international affairs, any desire to intervene on 
behalf of internal popular uprisings must climb the conceptual hill of 
justification, made needlessly steeper by reference to an inaccurate account 
of the historical origins—and hence legitimacy—of the international state 
system. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The appalling plight of the people of Burma remains just one in a long 
line of perfectly remediable yet unaddressed conditions throughout the 
developing world, tolerated by humankind and rationalized by myopic 
notions of the traditional or proper place of international law.  While 
certainly there is no single cause for the sustained patience the 
international community shows to the few remaining totalitarian 
governments on the planet, the extent to which the falsehood of Westphalia 
                                                                                                                          
226 See McGeown, supra note 197 (“India and China, as Burma’s main trading partners, have 
come under a lot of pressure from the international community to take firm action against Burma.  But 
people I met on the ground did not seem to have much faith in either nation to have a positive influence 
on the ruling generals.  One woman we spoke to said she thought China wasn’t interested in helping 
ordinary Burmese people—a view that was reinforced when she noticed that the soldiers who took part 
in the crackdown were brought into Rangoon in Chinese-made trucks.”). 
227 See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
228 See Mydans, supra note 211 (reporting in early December: “The streets are quiet in Myanmar.  
The ‘destructive elements’ are in jail.  The international outcry has faded.  The junta’s grip on power 
seems firm.”). 
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plays into that patience is the degree of speed with which legal and 
historical scholarship must correct its error.  This humble work, far from 
making any claim to bringing about actual change, seeks only to illustrate 
the link between an erroneous historical orthodoxy and the present 
suffering of real people. 
In addition to intervention issues, the fact that strong or even absolute 
notions of sovereignty—which persist among theorists and policy 
makers—obstructs the progression of human rights generally is probably 
not in dispute.  One of the most troubling consequences of the continued 
belief in the myth of Westphalia is how it has changed the rhetoric and 
decision-making process when discussing critical human rights issues in 
classrooms, political debates and foreign ministers’ offices.  To a certain 
degree, for those who believe the status quo has a certain normative 
legitimacy because “things are the way they are for a reason,” the 
descriptive inaccuracy of Westphalia poses enormous obstacles to 
challenging the status quo of the present state system.  Many political and 
legal theorists, particularly in international relations, it seems, suffer from 
an inexcusable deficiency of imagination when it comes to evaluating the 
wisdom of the current system as a whole.  When the specter of a threat to 
sovereignty is made as ground for opposition to a humanitarian cause, the 
image conjured in the mind of a Western scholar or policy maker may be 
that of challenging the very foundation upon which international law and 
society are based.  One might expect the natural response to be, yes, the 
notion of absolute sovereignty is being challenged, and that is at least a 
plausible starting point for the debate.  Instead, all too often the discussion 
is closed, as preserving sovereignty is seen as an end in itself.  Unwavering 
faith in the accuracy of the Westphalian mythology, unsurprisingly, 
provides no assistance for resolving these limitations. 
